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23 September 2016

Dear David

**Athenian Democracy at War**

I can confirm that, in the light of both readers' enthusiastic comments on your proposal for this book, I have submitted a Syndicate Paper to the Syndics' next meeting in October requesting that they offer you a contract.

All good wishes

*Michael L. Sharp*

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12 April 2016

Dear David

### **Athenian Democracy at War**

I have read your proposal for this book and am pleased to confirm my strong interest in considering it for publication by Cambridge. I have sent the partial manuscript you submitted out for review and, if the response is positive, would then expect to ask the Syndics to offer an advance contract conditional on readers' approval of the full revised manuscript.

I currently feel confident that you could deliver a full manuscript by 1 March 2017 given how far advanced the current manuscript is and your excellent track record of reliable delivery.

All good wishes

*Michael L. Sharp*

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Publisher, Classics and Byzantine Studies

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D. M. Pritchard 2018 (under contract), 'Naval matters in old comedy', in *Athenian Democracy at War*. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press).

## NAVAL MATTERS IN OLD COMEDY

David M. Pritchard

### 1. Introduction

The depiction of sailors in old comedy was mainly positive. On stage Aristophanes valued sailors as highly as hoplites. He depicted both groups fighting courageously. The toils that each bore in battle equally benefitted the state. In old comedy the victories of both groups received the same praise. Athenians equally met their duty to fight for the state by serving as sailors or hoplites. This depiction of sailors parallels what we find in public oratory. The audiences that Athenian politicians and litigants faced were predominantly nonelite. Their votes directly determined who would win the debate or the trial. Consequently public speakers were under real pressure to say what nonelite Athenians wanted to hear. In their speeches they were required to confirm the perceptions of the Athenian people. This requirement makes the parallels between old comedy and oratory significant. They suggest that the comic poets confirmed popular perceptions about sailors. There is a longstanding debate about whether this genre can be reliably used as evidence for popular perceptions. Such parallels strengthen the case that it can be so used. In their reflections on war nonelite Athenians certainly took over a lot from their elite forebears. They inherited the idea that victory in battle came from the courage of the victors. They continued to base their descriptions of courage on what the hoplite did to win his battles. On stage this soldier remained the central figure in generalisations about war and gender-roles. But the Athenian people also redefined significant elements of this inherited elite culture. They rejected the low estimation that archaic aristocrats had made of sailors. Nonelite Athenians valued sailors as highly as hoplites. They invented a new abstract theory of seapower. In this theory the state's security depended on the navy. The Athenian people believed that naval personnel deserved the credit for providing this security. Consequently sailors did not need to develop their own subculture to gain the recognition that they craved.

### 2. Four Ongoing Debates

In his comedies Aristophanes had a great deal to say about Athenian sailors. His characters and choruses discussed their experiences on board Athenian triremes.

This article was written when I was a research fellow, in 2016, at L'Institut d'études avancées de l'Université de Strasbourg and, in 2015, at Durham University's Institute of Advanced Study. I began researching it in 2014 when I was a visiting scholar in Greek history at Brown University. I sincerely thank my colleagues at these three universities for their hospitality and their discussions with me. This article is part of a larger cultural history of the Athenian armed forces that I am currently writing. For their helpful comments on the article I am most grateful to R. K. Balot, C. J. Butera, M. Canevaro, R. Dowe, E. Foster, V. Gabrielsen, M. F. Heath, D. Konstan, D. Lenfant, T. H. Nielsen, N. O'Sullivan, A. Papachrysostomou, D. J. Phillips, P. J. Rhodes and A. H. Sommerstein. All of the article's translations are my own.

Alternatively Aristophanes had them comment on the naval service of others or the Athenian navy more generally. The surviving fragments of his rivals indicate that they had no less interest in sailors. There are four ongoing debates relating to sailors in old comedy. Ancient historians do not agree on what the comic depiction of them meant. Therefore the first debate is about whether old comedy depicted sailors positively or negatively. One school of thought is that Aristophanes primarily ridiculed naval personnel.<sup>1</sup> A good example is the classic study of the standing of ancient-Greek sailors by Félix Bourriot. This study argues that Aristophanes depicted Athenian rowers as ill-disciplined and immoral men who were only interested in their pay.<sup>2</sup> Bourriot writes: ‘Certainly the characteristic feature of the comic poets is to mock and the humble peasant of Attica is no less spared. However, in the jokes aimed at the country people, one does not see the contempt that slips out, when the sailor is ridiculed.’<sup>3</sup> For this first school the hoplite was old comedy’s norm for a courageous Athenian.<sup>4</sup>

The second group in this first debate sees the exact opposite. For its proponents Aristophanes positively depicted the military service of sailors.<sup>5</sup> Miloslav Okál, for example, who wrote a study of the army in Aristophanes, argued: ‘Aristophanes does not ridicule sailors; to the contrary, he has some sympathy for them.’<sup>6</sup> This second group holds that Aristophanes had much less sympathy for hoplites.<sup>7</sup> The third group in this debate holds that Aristophanes depicted sailors just as positively as hoplites.<sup>8</sup> The recent book on Athenian democratic courage by Ryan Balot well illustrates it.<sup>9</sup> For Balot fifth-century comedies ‘speak without strain of Athens’s recognition of the courage of all citizens’.<sup>10</sup> Clearly there is a three-sided debate about old comedy’s depiction of sailors. To advance this first debate a close study is required of this genre’s surviving corpus.

These three groups also disagree about how this depiction of sailors related to popular perceptions. On one side of this second debate there are those who hold that Aristophanes generally reflected the outlook of nonelite Athenians.<sup>11</sup> For his part Victor Ehrenberg believed that Aristophanes ‘can time and again be seen sharing the views of a large section of the people’.<sup>12</sup> Bourriot and Balot share his belief. Consequently Bourriot argues that old comedy shows how the Athenians did not highly esteem sailors.<sup>13</sup> For Balot it shows how they did the exact opposite.<sup>14</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. Crowley 2012: 144 n. 24; van Wees 2004: 200, 211.

<sup>2</sup> Bourriot 1972: 27-30.

<sup>3</sup> Bourriot 1972: 28.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Bourriot 1972: 30; Cartledge 1998: 62.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Butera 2010: 145-6; Ehrenberg 1951: 299-301, 304; Hunt 1998 : 99; Loraux 1986: 212-13.

<sup>6</sup> Okál 1960: 108.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Ceccarelli 1993: 464-5; Gomme 1938: 107; Okál 1960: 106-7.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. Heath 1987: 39-40; Pritchard 1998: 55; 2010: 36-7; Sommerstein 2007: 208.

<sup>9</sup> E.g. Balot 2014: 184-5, 191, 194.

<sup>10</sup> Balot 2014: 185

<sup>11</sup> E.g. Heath 1987: 37, 43; Pritchard 2012: 20, 42-3.

<sup>12</sup> Ehrenberg 1951: 312.

<sup>13</sup> Bourriot 1972: 27.

other side of this debate consists of those who do not share this belief. A. W. Gomme for one held that Aristophanes's sympathy for sailors was personal.<sup>15</sup> Barry Strauss argues that his positive depiction of them was exceptional.<sup>16</sup> Hans van Wees assumes that Aristophanes put on stage the elite's negative view of sailors.<sup>17</sup> Nicole Loraux saw him as a political conservative.<sup>18</sup> Therefore this side of the debate is far from sure that old comedy depicted mainstream views.

These two sides reflect a third and wider debate about whether old comedy is reliable evidence for Athens's popular culture. The case that it is mainly rests on the genre's characteristics. The comedies of Aristophanes and, as far as we can tell, those of his rivals were usually about current affairs.<sup>19</sup> Typically their characters were nonelite Athenians or their wives, who contrived fantastical schemes for overcoming collective problems or popular anxieties.<sup>20</sup> Like other comic poets, Aristophanes ridiculed the leading politicians and other elite citizens.<sup>21</sup> He also parodied the public discourse of his own day.<sup>22</sup> What, for example, the antagonists of his *Knights* accuse each other of parallels the surviving political invective of fourth-century Athens (e.g. 847-59, 1044; *Dem.* 2.177; 3.23, 145, 220).<sup>23</sup> His *Wasps* parallels the commonplaces that are found in the law-court speeches of, for example, Lysias.<sup>24</sup> These parallels suggest that this comic poet was making fun of a public discourse that continued without major changes into the fourth century.<sup>25</sup> Therefore Aristophanes's subject matter was the politics and the public debates of contemporary Athens. In treating them he took the side of the nonelite citizens. From these characteristics some ancient historians infer that Aristophanes also depicted their nonelite outlook.<sup>26</sup>

Their case is strengthened by the performance-dynamic that the comic poets faced. Contests for comic choruses were introduced at the City Dionysia in the 480s and added to the Lenaea by the 440s.<sup>27</sup> Each of Aristophanes's 11 extant comedies was first staged at one or the other of these *polis*-level festivals. In the age of old comedy theatregoers were drawn from the same social strata as assemblygoers.<sup>28</sup> Certainly classical Athenians thought that the two audiences were one and the same (e.g. *Ar. Ran.* 778-9; *Pl. Leg.* 700c-1a; *Resp.* 492b-c). Even at the City Dionysia,

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<sup>14</sup> Balot 2014: 185.

<sup>15</sup> Gomme 1938: 107.

<sup>16</sup> Strauss 1996: 320.

<sup>17</sup> Van Wees 2004: 200.

<sup>18</sup> Loraux 1986: 306-8, 458 n. 205.

<sup>19</sup> For his rivals see e.g. Harvey and Wilkins 2000; Storey 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Coin-Longeray 2014: 48.

<sup>21</sup> Sommerstein 1996.

<sup>22</sup> Heath 1997: 230, 232-4; Ober and Strauss 1990.

<sup>23</sup> Henderson 1998: 264.

<sup>24</sup> E.g. *Ar. Vesp.* 283-5, 952-4, 957-9; *Lys.* 3.46; 12.38; 21.1-5; 25.11-13; Sommerstein 1983: 174, 191-2, 212.

<sup>25</sup> Heath 1997: 234.

<sup>26</sup> E.g. Bowie 1993: 10-11, 14; Carey 1994: 76-7; Heath 1987: 24, 38, 40-1; Pritchard 2013: 12-13.

<sup>27</sup> Pickard-Cambridge 1988: 40-2, 82-3.

<sup>28</sup> Heath 1987: 13; Pritchard 2013: 15 *pace* Sommerstein 1997.

where representatives of Athens's imperial subjects were present (e.g. *Ar. Ach.* 502-7; *Isoc.* 8.82), the majority of theatregoers were nonelite Athenians.<sup>29</sup> Formally ten judges voted on who should win these *agōnes* ('contests').<sup>30</sup> But they took their cue from the noisy responses that theatregoers made to each play.<sup>31</sup> Their responses were especially triggered by lines that strongly confirmed or contradicted their 'moral and political sentiments'.<sup>32</sup> Through their responses theatregoers could therefore indirectly determine which comic poet should win. The result – as far as Aristotle and Plato could see – was that the competitors had generally to confirm their audience's outlook and what it expected to see on stage.<sup>33</sup> All this strengthens the case that old comedy reflected popular perceptions. Yet those who advocate this case readily concede that Aristophanes did more than use such perceptions as the starting points for his jokes; for in pursuit of laughs he quite often created scenarios in which they were exaggerated or confounded.<sup>34</sup> Theatregoers especially enjoyed watching characters who broke 'legal, cultural and ethical codes basic to the city's social fabric'.<sup>35</sup> They apparently laughed no less when Aristophanes falsely accused them of such immorality (e.g. *Eccl.* 434-40; *Nub.* 1098-9, *Ran.* 274-6).<sup>36</sup> False accusations against the audience were a commonplace of old comedy.<sup>37</sup> Therefore care will be required to identify where Aristophanes is going against popular perceptions for the sake of laughs.

The apparent strength of this case makes surprising the small number of its advocates. The reason for this is an ongoing anxiety about Aristophanes's personal politics. The latter had been a long-discredited question before Geoffrey de Ste. Croix argued, in 1972, against this poet's political neutrality.<sup>38</sup> For de Ste. Croix Aristophanes was politically conservative: he questioned the growing participation of the *dēmos* ('people') in politics and took the elite's side.<sup>39</sup> De Ste. Croix argued that he used the comic stage to win broader support for his political conservatism.<sup>40</sup> This case against Aristophanes's reliability as evidence for popular perceptions quickly predominated.<sup>41</sup> Critiques of it only appeared in the 1980s.<sup>42</sup> But they made little impact.<sup>43</sup> In the 1990s Paul Cartledge rehearsed de Ste. Croix's case for a new

<sup>29</sup> Orfanos 2014: 216, 218; Roselli 2011: 115-57.

<sup>30</sup> Csapo and Slater 1994: 157-65.

<sup>31</sup> E.g. *Dem.* 18.265; 19.33; 21.226; *Pl. Resp.* 492a; *Leg.* 659a; MacDowell 1995: 11-12; Wallace 1997: 98-106.

<sup>32</sup> Pickard-Cambridge 1988: 275.

<sup>33</sup> E.g. *Arist. Poet.* 1453a; *Pol.* 1341b10-20; *Pl. Leg.* 659a-c, 700a-1b.

<sup>34</sup> E.g. Balot 2014: 185; Heath 1987: 8, 14, 36; Pritchard 2012: 34, 42-3; 2013: 16-17.

<sup>35</sup> Halliwell 2008: 210.

<sup>36</sup> Forrest 1986: 233; Halliwell 2008: 247; Revermann 2006: 102.

<sup>37</sup> Heath 1987: 21-4; Pritchard 2012: 39-43.

<sup>38</sup> It had been discredited by Gomme 1938.

<sup>39</sup> De Ste. Croix 1972: 357-8.

<sup>40</sup> De Ste. Croix 1972: 355, 362, 366-7, 370-1.

<sup>41</sup> E.g. Konstan 1985; Markle 1985: 267, 267 n. 5; Sommerstein 1984: 314; 328 n. 8; 331 n. 89; Storey 1987: 3-6.

<sup>42</sup> E.g. Edmunds 1987: esp. 65-6; Heath 1987.

<sup>43</sup> Walsh 2009: 56.

generation, while Alan Sommerstein attempted to fix its shortcomings.<sup>44</sup> It continues to be widely endorsed.<sup>45</sup> Indeed Nick Lowe writes that de Ste. Croix's case 'has not been substantially refuted'.<sup>46</sup> This case's impact has extended beyond its advocates: its wide currency has made those who have not taken sides reluctant to see old comedy as reliable evidence for nonelite views.

Therefore it may be possible to settle the first debate about how old comedy depicted sailors. But there will still be much uncertainty about this depiction's relationship to what the *dēmos* thought of them. Resolving this second debate will require 'some kind of external control'.<sup>47</sup> We will need to be able to compare old comedy against widely accepted evidence for the nonelite perspective. For this the best-possible point of comparison is deliberative and forensic oratory. This consisted of the speeches that Athenians delivered in the law-courts, the assembly or the democratic council. About 130 of these speeches have survived. Admittedly only 9 are dated before 400 BC (e.g. Andoc. 2; Antiph. 1, 5, 6; Lys. 12, 20-2, 34).<sup>48</sup> But old comedy, of course, continued into the 380s.<sup>49</sup> Indeed 2 of Aristophanes's surviving plays were first staged in the early fourth century. Another 33 speeches are dated between 400 and 385. This means that there is, in terms of time, a big overlap between what survives of old comedy and of forensic and deliberative oratory.

Certainly the performance-dynamics that the public speakers and the comic poets faced were similar. While litigants and politicians usually belonged to the elite, their audiences, like the theatre's, were predominantly nonelite.<sup>50</sup> Jurors, assemblygoers and councillors were as noisy as theatregoers.<sup>51</sup> They were just as likely to heckle and to interrupt a speaker as they were to cheer and to clap (e.g. Dem. 5.2; 10.44; 19.113, 122; 21.14; Lys. 12.73). Yet there was also an important difference in what public speakers faced: through their votes their audiences directly determined who would win the case or the debate. Consequently litigants and politicians were under still more pressure generally to say what their audiences wanted to hear (e.g. Arist. *Rh.* 1.9.30-1; 2.21.15-16; 2.22.3; Pl. *Resp.* 493d). In light of this it is widely agreed that their speeches are reliable evidence for popular perceptions.<sup>52</sup> By studying the extant speeches that are contemporaneous with old comedy it should be possible to work out how the *dēmos* of Aristophanes's day perceived sailors. This will let us see whether old comedy confirmed or contradicted their perceptions of them.

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<sup>44</sup> Cartledge 1990: 43-53, 82; Sommerstein 1996: 334-7; 1997: 64-72.

<sup>45</sup> E.g. Henderson 1998: 270-1; 2007: 189; Pelling 2000: 163, 288 n. 73; Powell 2001: 375.

<sup>46</sup> Lowe 2007: 58.

<sup>47</sup> Heath 1987: 8.

<sup>48</sup> For their dates see Ehrenberg 1951: 374-7; Ober 1989: 341-9.

<sup>49</sup> Konstan 2010: 188.

<sup>50</sup> For the class position of public speakers see e.g. Pritchard 2013: 5-6. For that of jurors and assemblygoers see e.g. Hansen 1991: 125-78, 183-6; Markle 1985: 281-91; Ober 1989: 132-8, 141-7; Todd 2007b.

<sup>51</sup> Balot 2006: 67-8; Blanshard 2010: 206; Roisman 2005: 135-9.

<sup>52</sup> E.g. Balot 2006: 50; Galbois and Rougier-Blanc 2014: 43; Ober 1978: 119; 1989: 43, 184-5, 312; Pelling 2000: 5-9; Roisman 2005: 3-6; Pritchard 2013: 11.

The two debates about old comedy's depiction of sailors directly bear on two wider debates about classical Athens's cultural history. Settling the first two debates will better clarify the extent to which Aristophanes is reliable evidence for popular perceptions. Doing so may also help to solve what is often called 'a paradox of classical Athens'.<sup>53</sup> This was the cultural prominence of the land-based hoplite in a naval democracy. Usually this paradox is put down to the low relative standing of Athenian sailors. The predominant view is that the Athenian *dēmos* esteemed hoplites much more highly than sailors.<sup>54</sup> Consequently they used this heavily armed soldier as a norm.<sup>55</sup> Athenians regularly reflected on the impact of age, gender and citizenship on military obligations. In these reflections they focussed on the hoplite. For Iain Spence this soldier's use as a norm had 'a stultifying effect' on the ability of the Athenians abstractly to think about non-hoplite forms of fighting.<sup>56</sup> Certainly it led them to define *aretē* ('courage') in terms of what hoplites did to win their pitched battles.<sup>57</sup> Obviously the way in which Athenian sailors fought was very different.<sup>58</sup> This made it more difficult for them to meet the definition of *aretē*. The result, it is argued, was that the Athenians judged sailors to be much less courageous than hoplites.<sup>59</sup> Cartledge even argues that they were perceived as no better than the cowardly archers.<sup>60</sup>

Bourriot puts beyond doubt that such a low estimation of sailors was common before Athenian democracy.<sup>61</sup> In epic poetry only elite heavily armed soldiers displayed *aretē* (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 2.200-2).<sup>62</sup> They did not fight sea battles. 'The Greeks', Bourriot writes, 'who disembarked at Troy had not encountered any squadron that had tried to oppose their armada or to sink their heavily laden ships.'<sup>63</sup> Nor did Homer favourably view the sailors of such ships, because he regularly depicted them displaying cowardice or other moral shortcomings.<sup>64</sup> One would have thought that Athenian sailors had the ability to change this negative depiction. In the fifth century

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<sup>53</sup> E.g. Cartledge 1998: 64-5; Strauss 1996: 313-14, 320; 2000: 261-2. Quotation from Strauss 1996: 313.

<sup>54</sup> E.g. Bourriot 1972: 25-7, 30; Cartledge 1998: 64-5; Christ 2006: 2 n. 2; Connor 1988: 26, 26 n. 98; Crowley 2012: 100-4; Loraux 1995: 27, 254 n. 34; Miller 2010: 332-4; Raaflaub 1996: Rosivach 1986: 54; 156-8; Spence 1993: 164-9; Strauss 1996: 321-2; van Wees 2004: 47, 200-1, 211.

<sup>55</sup> E.g. Bourriot 1972: 30; Christ 2006: 2; Crowley 2012: 104; 2014: 112; Hanson 1996: 296; Roubineau 2015: 53-4; Trundle 2010: 141.

<sup>56</sup> Spence 1993: 165-6, 167, 172-3. *Contra* Marr and Rhodes 2008: 103.

<sup>57</sup> Pritchard 2013: 180-4.

<sup>58</sup> Arrington 2015: 104; Pritchard 2010: 18-19.

<sup>59</sup> E.g. Crowley 2012: 103; Spence 1993: 167-9.

<sup>60</sup> Cartledge 1998: 63. For the *dēmos*'s perception of archers as cowards see e.g. Ar. *Ach.* 703-12; Dem. 9.46; Eur. *Heracl.* 160-6; Soph. *Aj.* 1120-4, 1142-6; Pritchard 1998: 48; Trundle 2010: 141-7.

<sup>61</sup> Bourriot 1972: 11-19.

<sup>62</sup> Balot 2014: 179-80, 198-203; Pritchard 2013: 198-200; Raaflaub 1996: 146.

<sup>63</sup> Bourriot 1972: 12.

<sup>64</sup> E.g. Hom. *Od.* 1.304; 4.374; 10.78, 201, 247, 454, 485, 568; 12.203, 225; Bourriot 1972: 19 n. 42.

a normal Athenian fleet required rowers in the tens of thousands.<sup>65</sup> Among them the largest portion was usually Athenian (e.g. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2; Thuc. 1.142.6; 8.74-7).<sup>66</sup> Therefore sailors must have been a significant presence in Athenian democracy's legal and political institutions and at its dramatic competitions. The inability of these sailors to make the public speakers and the comic poets change this traditionally negative depiction of them would indeed be a striking paradox. It would strengthen the argument that the classical Athenian *dēmos* were never capable of redefining the 'aristocratic ethics and behaviour patterns' that they had inherited.<sup>67</sup>

That sailors continued to be discredited in Athenian democracy may be the predominant view. But this view has always faced challenges. Seventy years ago Ehrenberg argued that in the wake of the Persian Wars 'the navy claimed for itself military valour and virtue'.<sup>68</sup> For Ehrenberg the Athenians thus appreciated the 'military virtue' of their sailors. More recently Strauss has drawn our attention to the Athenian monuments that evoked their achievements.<sup>69</sup> These monuments, Strauss argues, probably helped Athenian sailors to create a subculture in which their achievements were more fully recognised.<sup>70</sup> Joseph Roisman agrees that for fourth-century orators the hoplite was an important norm.<sup>71</sup> But Roisman cautions that the 'oratorical corpus provides no evidence for the inferior ranking of rowing in comparison to hoplite or cavalry service'.<sup>72</sup> Balot, among others, has likewise argued that the classical Athenians viewed sailors as just as courageous as hoplites.<sup>73</sup> Therefore there is also a wider debate about the standing of sailors in classical Athens's popular culture. Working out how sailors were depicted in old comedy and contemporaneous oratory will also be important for advancing this fourth debate.

### 3. Hoplites

Old comedy certainly used the hoplite as a norm. This usage can be most clearly observed in the three extant plays dramatising fantastical endings of the Peloponnesian War. In them Aristophanes may have fully recognised Athens as a sea power (see section 4). But he still focussed on the heavily armed soldier.<sup>74</sup> In his *Acharnians* Dicaeopolis suffers from war-weariness (e.g. 37-9, 72-3).<sup>75</sup> This he expresses in terms of his hoplite-arms: the war's outbreak is thus 'the clash of shields' (539), while his desire for peace is for the Athenians 'to hang up their

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<sup>65</sup> Bourriot 1972: 23-4.

<sup>66</sup> Hunt 2010: 255; Pritchard 2010: 26-7.

<sup>67</sup> E.g. Coin-Longeray 2014: 57; Jacquemin 2013: 10, 13; Raaflaub 1996: 158, from which the quotation comes.

<sup>68</sup> Ehrenberg 1951: 300-1. The first edition of this book was published in 1943.

<sup>69</sup> Strauss 1996: 320-2; 2000: 266. Butera 2010 commendably develops Strauss's argument.

<sup>70</sup> Strauss 1996: 321; 2000: 265; cf. Hunt 2007: 126-7; Miller 2010: 333. Cartledge equivocates on such a subculture (1998: 62, 64-5).

<sup>71</sup> Roisman 2005: 106-9.

<sup>72</sup> Roisman 2005: 127 n. 69.

<sup>73</sup> Balot 2014: 179-99; Pritchard 1998: 53-6.

<sup>74</sup> Taillardat 1965: 367-9.

<sup>75</sup> Konstan 2010: 190-4; Sommerstein 2014: 226-7.

shields' (56-8). Because they do not do so, Dicaeopolis strikes a personal peace-treaty (e.g. 130-3, 178-202). This allows him to return to his country home where he fully enjoys feasting and peace's other benefits (e.g. 719-1068).<sup>76</sup> The comedy concludes by comparing his personal wellbeing against the hardships of those who continue to be at war (1069-233). In order to illustrate such hardships Aristophanes described another protagonist's service as a hoplite (e.g. 1103, 1106, 1118, 1122, 1124, 1131). He used this soldier in the same way in his *Lysistrata*. This comedy finds Greece's women tired of the campaigning of their husbands that always keeps them away from home and the marital bed (e.g. 99-112, 591-2).<sup>77</sup> Again 'peace is a matter of private interest and welfare'.<sup>78</sup> In arguing for it Aristophanes avoided any mention of battlefield casualties.<sup>79</sup> In *Lysistrata* the women also express their desire for peace by focussing on the hoplite: they wish to stop their husbands bearing against each other 'shield', 'spear' or 'sword' (49-53, 105-6; cf. 556-60). *Lysistrata* shows how the hoplite's use as a norm extended to gender-roles.<sup>80</sup> In it a magistrate protests that Attic wives have no relationship with war (587-8). The eponymous heroine's reply is that they certainly do, because they 'bear sons and send them out as hoplites' (588-90; cf. Thuc. 2.44.3-4).

Aristophanes employed the hoplite for metonyms of war the most in his *Peace*. With the aid of farmers this comedy's Trygaeus rescues the goddess of peace (e.g. 289-300). With her rescue the war ends and all resume their happy lives in the country (e.g. 551-600).<sup>81</sup> Again Aristophanes expressed war-weariness only in terms of the hoplite's experiences.<sup>82</sup> The chorus of farmers are sick of going to the Lyceum 'with spear, with shield' (352-7). Athenian hoplites frequently had to muster on this athletics-field before departing for a battle.<sup>83</sup> They complain about the commander of their tribe's hoplites, who, they say, unfairly drafts them (1172-90).<sup>84</sup> Their response to the war's end is the same: they rejoice at leaving behind shields, helmets, and the cheese and the onions that hoplites brought as food on campaigns (e.g. 312, 335-6, 1127-9, 1172-90).<sup>85</sup> Aristophanes closed *Peace* by portraying the downturn in arms-manufacturing (1208-64). Here he focussed not, for example, on shipbuilders but on the makers of hoplite-arms (e.g. 1209-13, 1255). The items that Trygaeus retrofits for agriculture are all those of the hoplite: helmet-crests (1214-17), a suit of armour (1224-63), a war-trumpet (1240-1) and spears (1260-3).<sup>86</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Hunt 2010: 248-9.

<sup>77</sup> Konstan 2010: 196-8; Sommerstein 2014: 227.

<sup>78</sup> Ehrenberg 1951: 309-10.

<sup>79</sup> Sommerstein 2014: 225-6, 228-9, 234. In so doing Aristophanes paralleled the reluctance of public speakers to mention such casualties (Kapellos 2013: 464, 466, 468).

<sup>80</sup> Pritchard 1998: 47-8.

<sup>81</sup> Konstan 2010: 194-5.

<sup>82</sup> Pritchard 1998: 44-5.

<sup>83</sup> Christ 2001: 407; Pritchard 2013: 102, 159.

<sup>84</sup> For the taxiarch's role in the conscription of a tribe's hoplites see e.g. Crowley 2012: 27-35.

<sup>85</sup> Conscribed hoplites were required to bring enough of such rations for 3 days (e.g. Ar. *Ach.* 197, 1097; *Vesp.* 243; Crowley 2014: 114).

<sup>86</sup> The trumpet was used to signal commands in hoplite battles (e.g. Andoc. 1.45; Ar. *Ran.* 1042).

The Athenians were not supposed to do what these three comedies depicted them doing. In fact they believed that it was the duty of every Athenian to fight for the state whenever he was asked.<sup>87</sup> In bearing this duty a citizen had to be prepared to draw on his personal wealth or even to lay down his life.<sup>88</sup> He always had to put the state's interest ahead of his own.<sup>89</sup> In a law-court a litigant who fulfilled this duty earned the *kharis* ('gratitude') of his jurors.<sup>90</sup> He who did not was roundly criticised (e.g. Isoc. 18.47-8; Lys. 31.7, 14). In these plays Aristophanes specifically depicted hoplites failing to meet this duty. Some have read this as a general criticism of this soldier.<sup>91</sup> They argue that Aristophanes simply lacked sympathy for hoplites (see section 2). This reading can be questioned for two reasons. The first reason is that his audience probably saw this depiction mainly as funny. We have already noted how the comic poets often got theatregoers to laugh by making their characters break basic norms. In depicting Athenian hoplites or their Attic wives putting personal interest ahead of the state's Aristophanes was doing just that. These three plays were performed during a period of intense Athenian warmaking. Their audiences would have included many hoplites who had been recently drafted. They, it can also be assumed, enjoyed the fantasy of military duty being so easily escaped.<sup>92</sup> Clearly Aristophanes and his rivals assumed that theatregoers as a group enjoyed it no less; for among their fragmentary plays are five in which peace is once again fantastically realised.<sup>93</sup> In them war-weariness or joy at war's end was apparently also expressed in terms of hoplites.<sup>94</sup>

The second reason is that tragedy employed the hoplite in a similar way to old comedy.<sup>95</sup> Plays by Euripides well illustrate this. His *Phoenician Women* for one describes the battle between Oedipus's sons over Thebes. It mentions a wide range of soldiers from hoplites and horsemen to archers and javelin-throwers (e.g. 111-13, 139-40, 1072-4, 1095-6, 1141-3, 1189-92). In spite of this range, its characters, when making general remarks, focus only on the hoplite. Jocasta thus describes the battle's outbreak as 'touching the spear' and the attacking army as 'the shield of the Argives' (78, 82; cf. 1099). The chorus of captives, who call themselves 'booty of the spear' (281-2; cf. 705), use 'spear' as their metaphor for an army (728, 824). For Eteocles, Thebes's king, battle is simply 'the *agōn* ('contest') of the spear' (780).<sup>96</sup> Euripides likewise used the heavily armed soldier as the norm for gender-roles.<sup>97</sup> A famous

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<sup>87</sup> E.g. Aesch. *Sept.* 10-20; Ar. *Eq.* 1369-72; *Vesp.* 1114-21; Eur. *Heracl.* 824-7; Thuc. 2.43.1; Pritchard 2010: 6.

<sup>88</sup> E.g. Ar. *Ran.* 1063-4; Isoc. 18.60-1; Lys. 16.18-19; Thuc. 2.42.4; Arrington 2015: 278-9; Hunt 2010: 249-50.

<sup>89</sup> E.g. Ar. *Ach.* 598-606; *Eccl.* 205-8; *Eq.* 573-6, 1350-5; [Dem.] 50.63; Lys. 21.24.

<sup>90</sup> Hunt 2010: 255.

<sup>91</sup> E.g. Okál 1960: 106-7.

<sup>92</sup> Halliwell 2008: 211; Heath 1987: 14.

<sup>93</sup> Ar. frs. 93, 199, 305, 309, 414ii Kassel and Austin; Theopompus fr. 8.

<sup>94</sup> E.g. Ar. frs. 306, 418; Theopompus fr. 8; cf. Hermippus fr. 48.

<sup>95</sup> Pritchard 1998: 45-6.

<sup>96</sup> For this common conception of battle as an *agōn* see e.g. Pritchard 2013: 167-76.

<sup>97</sup> E.g. Eur. frs. 266; 282; 298; 360.23-5 Snell, Kannicht and Radt.

example is Medea's explanation why women have hard lives (Eur. *Med.* 248-51): 'They say of us women that we live a life without danger at home, while they fight with the spear. In this they think badly. How I would prefer to stand three times beside a shield than to give birth once.' Comedy compared the genders in the same way (e.g. Ar. *Thesm.* 820-9). These parallels between the two genres suggest that the comic poets had no choice about which combatant to focus on in their anti-war comedies. The use of the hoplite as a norm was simply traditional.<sup>98</sup> This hoplite-centred way of thinking clearly predated Athenian democracy, because it was evoked all the time in the paintings on the pots of sixth-century Athens.<sup>99</sup> Consequently it was part of the archaic elite culture that the classical-Athenian *dēmos* had inherited.<sup>100</sup>

#### 4. The Navy

Tradition may have required Aristophanes to use the hoplite as a norm in his three anti-war comedies (see section 2). But it did not prevent him from fully acknowledging that Athens was a major seapower.<sup>101</sup> In his *Acharnians* Dicaeopolis gets to choose between peace-treaties of different lengths (185-202). He rejects the five-year treaty on the grounds that it smells of pitch and the *paraskeuē* ('preparation') of warships (189-90). Pitch was used to waterproof trireme-hulls (e.g. [Dem.] 50.26).<sup>102</sup> Later Dicaeopolis describes what such a *paraskeuē* looks like. He argues that Sparta was not solely to blame for the Peloponnesian War's outbreak, because it was responding to an Athenian trade-embargo against one of its allies (530-40). The Athenians, Dicaeopolis continues, would have done no less; for, if Sparta even stole a puppy from one of their smallest allies, they would instantly ready for action three-hundred warships (541-5).<sup>103</sup> Consequently the city would be full of the hubbub of sailors about trierarchs, of their purchases before embarking and of last-minute preparations in the *neōria* or dockyards (545-54). Dicaeopolis's argument makes clear that Athens wages war primarily with warships.

Aristophanes similarly characterised Athenian warmaking in his other two anti-war comedies.<sup>104</sup> In *Lysistrata* the Spartan woman doubts that the sex strike will stop the war, because, she fears, the Athenians will keep fighting as long as they have warships and the money to pay for them (173-4).<sup>105</sup> In *Peace* Hermes explains that the Peloponnesian War broke out, when the Athenians responded to Sparta's aggression by sending out warships (625-7; cf. Thuc. 1.143.5). He warns them that there will only be peace, if they withdraw 'towards the sea' (503-7). Here Hermes implies that the Athenians should be content with their power at sea.<sup>106</sup> In other plays

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<sup>98</sup> Roisman 2005: 106-9; Strauss 1996: 321-2.

<sup>99</sup> Lissarrague 1989: 44-5, 48; 1990: 138, 234-7; Roubineau 2015: 51-3.

<sup>100</sup> Pritchard 1998: 52.

<sup>101</sup> Pritchard 1998: 55.

<sup>102</sup> Blanshard 2010: 220.

<sup>103</sup> Okál 1960: 103.

<sup>104</sup> Ehrenberg 1951: 299.

<sup>105</sup> Sommerstein 1990: 164.

<sup>106</sup> Sommerstein 1985: 156.

Aristophanes explicitly wrote about the extent of this seapower. In his *Birds* Tereus asks two Athenian exiles what their homeland is (108). The reply of Peisetaerus makes the Athenian navy a metonym for Athens: they are ‘from where the fine triremes come’. Later Tereus suggests that they might find sanctuary by the Red Sea (143-5). Peisetaerus strenuously objects that they cannot be anywhere ‘by the sea’, as, one day, the *Salamina* could easily turn up with a legal summons for them (145-7).<sup>107</sup> The *Salamina* was one of the two triremes that Athens used for the urgent conveying of messengers and generals (e.g. Thuc. 3.33.1, 77.3; 6.53.1, 61.4; 8.74.1).<sup>108</sup> If it was required, these two warships could also play a leading part in sea battles. This humorous exchange confirmed the popular perception that Athens had the power to sail into any sea (e.g. Lys. 2.2, 55; Thuc. 2.41.4, 62.1).

In *Knights* Aristophanes left no doubt that Athens was a naval superpower (e.g. 562-4, 1300-15). This play unflatteringly portrayed the Athenian *dēmos* as a senile old man and the politicians who competed for his favour as his household slaves (e.g. 40-3, 752-5, 1099, 1349).<sup>109</sup> It opens with two of his slaves complaining that a third slave, Paphlagon, has completely won over Demos and uses his undue influence to maltreat them (1-80). Therefore, when they learn that the old man’s favour will pass from Paphlagon to a lowly sausage seller and, by chance, come across one (109-47), it is understandable that they immediately tell him how great his power will be. As Athens’s leading politician, according to First Slave, Sausage Seller is going to rule the theatre, the *agora* (‘civic centre’), the harbours, the assembly, the council and the generals (160-7). To this First Slave adds the Aegean Sea’s islands, ‘the trading-ports and the merchant ships’ and the sweep from the eastern Mediterranean to North Africa (168-74). This list suggests that Athens controlled the Aegean’s Greeks, including their trade (cf. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.3), and was the Mediterranean’s leading seapower. By listing this power next to key political institutions Aristophanes was also characterising the fleet as a vital part of the state (cf. *Ar. Av.* 592-601, 710-11, 1537-41). In tune with this characterisation *Knights* depicted its maintenance as unambiguously good.<sup>110</sup> Themistocles is thus praised for building the Piraeus (813-16), while regular shipbuilding and paying sailors promptly are norms (555, 1065-6, 1350-5, 1366-8).

In *Knights* Aristophanes also repeatedly drew on the navy for his figures of speech (e.g. 429-41, 830).<sup>111</sup> He used the naval metaphors just as frequently in his other comedies.<sup>112</sup> Bourriot argues that the ‘maritime metaphors’ that Aristophanes ‘abundantly’ used were ‘understood by the crowd’.<sup>113</sup> For Bourriot this usage does

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<sup>107</sup> Sommerstein 1987: 208.

<sup>108</sup> Pritchard 2015: 108-9.

<sup>109</sup> Pritchard 2012: 36, 40.

<sup>110</sup> Butera 2010: 145-6.

<sup>111</sup> I intend to discuss the nautical imagery of Athenian drama elsewhere. By far the best discussion of the use of the ship as a metaphor for the state by Greek poets is Brock 2013: 53-68.

<sup>112</sup> E.g. *Ar. Ach.* 94-7; *Eccl.* 1089-61, 1105-7; *Lys.* 63-4; *Pax* 16-17, 1305; *Ran.* 197, 534-41; *Vesp.* 477-8; frs. 47, 87; Ceccarelli 1993: 464 n. 77; Pritchard 1998: 53. Other comic poets used similar metaphors (e.g. Polyzelus fr. 3; Strattis fr. 31).

<sup>113</sup> Bourriot 1972: 27.

not imply that the Athenians highly esteemed sailors. An example from *Knights* clearly illustrates Bourriot's first argument. This comedy culminates in a political *agōn* or debate (763-1203). Before it, the last piece of advice that the chorus-leader gives Sausage Seller is to raise his 'dolphins' and to bring his warship alongside (761-2). The 'dolphin' was the grappling hook that Athenian sailors deployed for boarding an enemy trireme (Pherecrates fr. 12). This figure of speech reinforced his earlier advice that Sausage Seller must closely engage with Paphlagon's arguments (756-60). Theatregoers needed a good knowledge of the Athenian navy to understand this metaphor. Consequently this example illustrates how a metaphor only works if the 'vehicle' that it introduces to describe something else is well known.<sup>114</sup> But another example from *Knights* casts doubt on Bourriot's second argument. Aristophanes used its *parabasis* or choral interlude to rebut the criticism that he had taken too long to direct a comedy in his own name (512-14). He was, the chorus-leader argues, right to take his time, because, among other reasons (514-40), he knew that he had first to be a rower and a *prōiratēs* ('bow-officer') before he became a *kubernētēs* or helmsman (541-4). Each Athenian trireme had among its petty officers a *prōiratēs* and a *kubernētēs*.<sup>115</sup> Such officers rose up from the ranks of rowers.<sup>116</sup> In this interlude Aristophanes compared himself to naval personnel. He used their career ladder as a justification of his own apprenticeship in comedy. This metaphor would have lost its argumentative force if sailors were held in low regard.

The Athenian *dēmos* manifestly had the Greek world's strongest navy. But it has been argued that the ongoing prominence of the hoplite in their popular culture stopped them from abstractly thinking about seapower (see section 2). One Athenian who got over this barrier was Thucydides. His historiography analysed how *dunamis* ('military might') primarily depended on warships and the *khrēmata* ('money') to pay for them. But ancient historians generally agree that his 'quite complex theory of power' was not widely held.<sup>117</sup> Some argue that he actually invented it himself.<sup>118</sup> A good example is Lisa Kallet. For her this theory 'appears in literature for the first time in Thucydides's *History*'.<sup>119</sup> Therefore Kallet argues that he was 'the first to formulate in writing a fundamentally new definition of the relationship of wealth and power'.<sup>120</sup> For another group of ancient historians Thucydides instead drew heavily on the theorising about seapower among the sophists (e.g. [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 2.2-6).<sup>121</sup> From the 450s these intellectuals appeared in increasing numbers to provide higher education to elite Athenians.<sup>122</sup> They also published theoretical treatises on a wide

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<sup>114</sup> Bennett and Royle 2009: 80-7; Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 14-24.

<sup>115</sup> E.g. [Dem.] 50.47, 50; Pl. *Leg.* 706b-c; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2; *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1032.156-68; Morrison 1984: 55-6; Morrison and Coates 1986: 111-12; van Wees 2004: 210-11.

<sup>116</sup> Jordan 2000: 96.

<sup>117</sup> De Romilly 1967: 261; de Souza 2013: 54-5, 62.

<sup>118</sup> E.g. Ceccarelli 1993: 451, 466-7; Hunt 1998: 101; Gabrielsen 2001: 74.

<sup>119</sup> Kallet-Marx 1993: 6.

<sup>120</sup> Kallet-Marx 1993: 205-6.

<sup>121</sup> E.g. Gagarian 1994: 64-5.

<sup>122</sup> Pritchard 2013: 107.

range of topics.<sup>123</sup> Their treatises typically did not endorse popular perceptions, as they only written for elite readers.<sup>124</sup> W. Robert Connor for one argues that Thucydides's 'analysis of power' was 'consistent with many of the dominant tendencies in contemporary intellectual life'.<sup>125</sup> Yet both groups agree that the theory of *dunamis* that this historian used went against the prevailing traditional explanation of military success.<sup>126</sup> This explanation went back to epic poetry and primarily put victory down to the *aretē* of the victors. Neither group would therefore dispute that the *dēmos*'s use of the hoplite as a norm stymied their ability abstractly to think about seapower.

Thucydides began his *History* with a narrative about Greece before the Persian Wars (1.1-23). Postclassical authors called it 'The Archaeology'. Thucydides saw this early history as a series of seapowers.<sup>127</sup> In narrating it he was able to illustrate a theory of seapower. Minos of Crete, Thucydides writes, was the first to acquire a navy (1.4.1). With these warships Minos created a naval empire that gave him the *prosodoi* ('income-streams') to pay for them. He also defeated the pirates that imperilled this income. For Thucydides their defeat brought unexpected benefits for the Greeks. Trade began to flourish (1.2.1-2, 8.2-4). With the *periousia khrēmatōn* ('surplus wealth') that came from it states could build walls for security against their neighbours (1.7.1). Agamemnon was the next to acquire seapower. Thucydides attributed his *dunamis* to his warships and inherited wealth (1.9.2-5). Nevertheless Agamemnon's Trojan expedition was undermined by *akhrēmatia* (1.11.2).<sup>128</sup> Thucydides illustrated what this lack of money meant. To supply his army Agamemnon had to divert much of it into farming and piracy (1.11.1-2). The result was that he never had the concentration of forces quickly to take Troy.<sup>129</sup> Thucydides also described early Greece's other seapowers (1.13-15). He concluded (1.15.1-2): 'Such were the ancient and the more recent navies of the Greeks. Those who paid attention to them acquired quite a lot of power by reason of income-streams and imperialism.'

Thucydides did not always make warships and money the building-blocks of military might.<sup>130</sup> This is evident in the advice that Thucydides had Themistocles give the Athenians after the Persian Wars. By becoming sailors 'they would greatly excel in acquiring *dunamis*' (1.93-4). But Themistocles advised that getting it required them to fortify the Piraeus's harbours. Consequently Athenian *dunamis* would depend on warships and walls. Themistocles apparently also saw them as the basis of the state's security; for, according to Thucydides, he advised the *dēmos* to withdraw within their walls and to fight with their warships, if they were ever beaten on land

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<sup>123</sup> E.g. de Romilly 1992; Joyal, McDougall and Yardley 2009: 59-120.

<sup>124</sup> Lenfant 2013: 50; Pritchard 2013: 19-20.

<sup>125</sup> Connor 1984: 25-6.

<sup>126</sup> E.g. Connor 1984: 23, 25-7; Kallet-Marx 1993: 13, 33, 206.

<sup>127</sup> Foster 2010: 8-43; Kallet-Marx 1993: 21-6; de Romilly 1967: 240-98; Starr 1978.

<sup>128</sup> On this term see e.g. Galbois and Rougier-Blanc 2014: 39-40.

<sup>129</sup> Foster 2010: 31-2.

<sup>130</sup> Foster 2010 carefully analyses his changing treatment of such building-blocks in his *History*'s first two books.

(1.93.6). Nevertheless Thucydides's initial formulation of *dunamis* reappeared in the speeches that Athens's leading politician made on the Peloponnesian War's eve or immediately after its outbreak. Thucydides's Pericles put Athenian military might down to warships and money (e.g. 1.142.4-5, 143.4-5; 2.13.2-3, 65.7). The latter consisted of imperial income-streams and cash-reserves.<sup>131</sup> Pericles illustrated how Sparta's lack of money undermined their waging of wars: they were unable *naus plēroun* ('to fill warships') and to fight long wars (1.141.3-4, 7). Pericles advised the *dēmos* to preserve the building-blocks of their seapower. They must never lose their naval superiority (e.g. 1.142.6-9; 143.2, 5). They must guard the imperial income that paid for it (e.g. 1.143.5; 2.13.2-3).

Thucydides manifestly made abstract points about seapower. It is only rarely noted that the same abstract thinking appeared in old comedy (e.g. *Ar. Ach.* 646-51).<sup>132</sup> It did so very clearly in the *Birds* of 415/14. In this play Aristophanes had Tereus explain that 'it is from enemies, not friends, that states learnt (*emathon*) to toil over high walls and to acquire long ships. This lesson keeps secure (*sōizei*) children, households and possessions' (378-80). This lesson parallels the security-formulation of Thucydides's Themistocles. The past tense of its first verb suggests that it was already widely known. In *Lysistrata*, we have noted, the Spartan woman fears that Athens will keep waging war as long as it has warships and money (*Ar. Lys.* 173-4). In a comedy soon after the Peloponnesian War Demetrius wrote (fr. 2): 'The Lacedaemonians demolished our walls and seized our triremes so that they would be no longer beaten at sea.' The military might that *dunamis* described was rare and overwhelming.<sup>133</sup> Those with it could fight long wars. They usually beat their enemies (e.g. *Thuc.* 5.100-1). Consequently these two comic passages implied *dunamis* even if they did not mention it. But *dunamis* was mentioned in a comedy before the death of Pericles in 429/8. In it Telecleides described this politician's complete control of public policy (*Plut. Vit. Per.* 16.1-2). The Athenians, Telecleides writes, have handed over to him, among other policies, walls, imperial income and military might (fr. 45). Aristophanes, finally, illustrated, as Thucydides did, seapower's dependence on money. Athens's state treasuries were on the Acropolis.<sup>134</sup> In his *Lysistrata* the eponymous heroine assures the Spartan woman that Attic women will cut the supply of money by seizing the Acropolis (175-9, 488, 496). After this seizure an Athenian magistrate immediately finds that he cannot pay for naval matériel (420-3; cf. *Andoc.* 2.10). In *Wealth* Aristophanes likewise noted that money fills (*plērō*) triremes (112), while in his *Banqueters* of 428/7 it must be spent on them as well as the walls (fr. 230).

Comedy's discussion of seapower in abstract terms shows that Thucydides did not invent them. Most of the comedies that did so were first performed during the Peloponnesian War. Three of them dated back to the 420s if not earlier. From 424/3 Thucydides was in exile (*Thuc.* 5.26.3). He largely wrote his *History* away from

<sup>131</sup> Hunt 2010: 33-4.

<sup>132</sup> E.g. Pritchard 1998: 55.

<sup>133</sup> E.g. *Andoc.* 3.37; *Lys.* 2.55-6; *Thuc.* 1.9.1-2, 13.5, 18.1, 93.3-4; 5.95.1.

<sup>134</sup> Pritchard 2015: 18.

Athens (1.1.1, 13.3). Consequently it is highly unlikely that the comic poets drew on his treatment of seapower. But they may still have been influenced by what the sophists wrote about it (e.g. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2, 11, 2.4-16).<sup>135</sup> De Ste. Croix argued that Aristophanes used his comedies to win over theatregoers to his conservative politics (see section 2). It is possible that if he did this he also drew on the theoretical treatises that elite Athenians read.<sup>136</sup> Indeed Cratinus criticised Aristophanes for putting arguments of sophists on stage (fr. 342).<sup>137</sup> What rules out this possibility is deliberative and forensic oratory. Public speakers manifestly made the same generalisations about *dunamis*.<sup>138</sup> They were under even more pressure than the comic poets to say what nonelite Athenians wanted to hear. Their speeches therefore confirm that the *dēmos* were capable of thinking abstractly about seapower.

During 392/1 Andocides negotiated a peace-treaty for ending the Corinthian War (Andoc. 3.33-5).<sup>139</sup> On his return from Sparta he delivered an assembly-speech in support of this treaty.<sup>140</sup> Andocides had a lot to say about seapower. The peace-treaty that ended the Peloponnesian War directly led to the overthrow of Athenian democracy (e.g. Lys. 2.61-4; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2-4). Consequently Andocides knew that he had to convince assemblygoers that this would not happen again (3.1). He tried to do so by showing how earlier peace-treaties had resulted in ‘the very opposite’ of what had occurred in 405/4 (2.4, 6, 10). This speech’s discussion of fifth-century history is notoriously unreliable. But it leaves no doubt about what the *dēmos* saw as ‘the building-blocks of Athenian *dunamis*’.<sup>141</sup> Andocides argued that the Athenians had reaped a range of benefits from peace with the Spartans. They included the navy’s *neōria* (3.7), specialist corps, such as the archers (5, 7), and money, which, like Thucydides, he broke down into imperial income and cash-reserves (7-9). But the two benefits that he mentioned the most were warships and walls (5, 7, 37, 39).<sup>142</sup> Andocides described such benefits as ‘*agatha* (‘good things’) for the state and *dunamis* for the Athenian people’ (4, 9). They also gave the state *sōtēria* or security (12). Andocides’s description of the peace-treaty of 405/4 parallels that of Demetrius (fr. 2): the Spartans demolished Athens’s walls and seized its warships so that it would never acquire *dunamis* again (39). He concluded that by voting for his peace-treaty the Athenians would recover these two building-blocks of their former *dunamis* (39-40).

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<sup>135</sup> Spence 2010: 153.

<sup>136</sup> For their reading of such works see e.g. Pritchard 2013: 59.

<sup>137</sup> O’Sullivan 2006.

<sup>138</sup> Ober 1978.

<sup>139</sup> Asmonti 2015: 175.

<sup>140</sup> Harris 2000 argues that Andoc. 3 is not an authentic speech of Andocides but a later rhetorical exercise. As proof Harris points to, among other things, the fact that the speech’s ambassadors do not follow norms of classical-Greek diplomacy. But Magonetto 2013 shows to the contrary that the speech was consistent with such norms. On balance Aeschin. 2.172-5 and Philochorus 328F149a *FGrH* support the case for authenticity. The clear parallels between this speech and those of Lysias with respect to seapower (see below) provide further support.

<sup>141</sup> Ober 1978: 125.

<sup>142</sup> Missou 1992: 74-6.

In the law-court speeches that Isocrates and Lysias wrote for Athenian clients they discussed seapower in the same abstract terms (e.g. Isoc. 18.59; Lys. 27.3; 28.11).<sup>143</sup> Several years, for example, after Athens's defeat in 405/4 Lysias reminded jurors how it had led to the loss of their walls, warships and dockyards (13.46-7). Without them, Lysias argued, 'all the *dunamis* of the state' was undone. Lysias also echoed the security 'lesson' of Aristophanes (Ar. Av. 378-80). In one speech he made Athenian *sōtēria* depend on warships and walls (Lys. 18.5-6), while in another it solely rested on the fleet (26.3-4; cf. Dem. 22.13-16).<sup>144</sup> Lysias, finally, was just as capable as Aristophanes of illustrating seapower's reliance on money (e.g. 28.2). Such parallels show how in depicting seapower the comic poets simply confirmed popular perceptions. They prove that the *dēmos*'s use of the hoplite as a norm did not stop them reflecting abstractly on their fleet. These findings also advance our understanding of Thucydides. Certainly his account of Greece's early history broke new ground. In the eyes of the Athenians, for example, Minos was simply the violent ruler that had fed their children to the Minotaur (e.g. Eur. frs. 385-6 Snell, Kannicht and Radt; Pl. *Leg.* 706b-d).<sup>145</sup> Therefore Thucydides's depiction of him as an unwitting benefactor was a provocative innovation. But the terms that he used to describe him and early Greece's other seapowers were not his own. Instead Thucydides drew on the generalisations about military might and security that were already part of Athenian public discourse. At best he was engaged in an 'intellectual systemisation' of how the Athenian *dēmos* viewed seapower.<sup>146</sup>

The classical Athenians thus had clear views about their navy. In both of their *dunamis*-formulations warships were essential. They saw them as no less important for their state's *sōtēria*. In their eyes naval shipbuilding was an unambiguous *agathon* or good thing. Their public speakers understandably built on these views in their debates. Politicians regularly tried to win over assemblygoers by explaining how their proposals would strengthen the fleet (e.g. Andoc. 3.37, 39-40; Lys. 13.15-16). Alternatively they reminded them of the good that they had already done it (e.g. Andoc. 2.10-12). Politicians also argued that their rivals should be, for example, denied a magistracy or convicted of treason, because of the harm that they had caused the fleet (e.g. Lys. 26.23-4; 28.2, 11).<sup>147</sup> The same claims were made in the law-courts. Litigants for their part encouraged jurors to have *kharis* for them by rehearsing how their forebears had protected the navy (e.g. Isoc. 16.18, 20-1; Lys. 18.5-6). They were known to attack opponents for destroying, for example, essential naval infrastructure, such as the dockyards (e.g. Lys. 12.99; 30.22), or even the warships themselves (e.g. 12.38-40, 95; 13.34, 46-7). From the 420s the comic poets had their characters or choruses claim the same (e.g. Ar. *Ran.* 362-5; Cratinus fr. 210). In *Acharnians*, for example, Aristophanes made an informer threaten to prosecute Dicaeopolis for buying a lamp-wick that might burn down the *neōria* (920-

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<sup>143</sup> Ceccarelli 1993: 452.

<sup>144</sup> Ober 1978: 122-3.

<sup>145</sup> Foster 2010: 21-2; Mills 1997: 224-5.

<sup>146</sup> Dover 1974: 1-2.

<sup>147</sup> Pritchard 2015: 70-1.

5). In his *Knights*, Paphlagon, when he first encounters Sausage Seller, accuses him of giving the Spartans naval matériel (288-9; cf. Platon fr. 23). The comic poets regularly parodied contemporary oratory (see section 2). Because so little of it survives from before 400, their plays furnish valuable indirect evidence on what the later fifth century's oratorical commonplaces were.

The final *agōn* in *Knights* leaves no doubt that the navy's maintenance was one such commonplace (763-1203). This *agōn* was a clear parody of political debate: it took place before Demos in the assembly's meeting-place. Sausage Seller tries to get the old man's favour by offering an oracle 'about the navy' (1063, 1070-3). This certainly gets the attention of Demos, who asks how his sailors are going to be paid (1065-6). Later Paphlagon tells him that Athena wants him to eat a cake 'in order that we will row the warships well' (1181-2). Not wanting to be outdone, Sausage Seller says that the goddess wants the navy to use intestines instead (1183-6).<sup>148</sup> He, ultimately, wins this debate and is able to restore Demos's ability to make sound decisions. His first decision is that sailors will be paid as soon as they return to the Piraeus (1366-8). For Bourriot these repeated references to pay characterised sailors as money-grubbing.<sup>149</sup> Logistics required sailors to be paid: because the trireme lacked the space for stowing food, its crew had, each day, to buy it from local markets or private houses (e.g. [Dem.] 50.22, 53-5).<sup>150</sup> The Athenian *dēmos* knew that naval service was also the sole livelihood of many sailors (e.g. [Dem.] 50.11). Consequently they strongly believed that their payment was a priority.<sup>151</sup> In insisting on this in *Knights* Aristophanes was therefore not criticising sailors. He was simply confirming a popular belief about them.

## 5. Sailors

Bourriot concedes that the classical Athenians highly valued naval infrastructure.<sup>152</sup> For him the *dēmos* clearly were 'proud of their harbours, their triremes and their dockyards'. But Bourriot still claims that 'this high regard did not descend to the sailors'. Old comedy and contemporaneous oratory completely disprove this last claim. They show how the Athenian *dēmos* esteemed sailors as highly as hoplites. For them a citizen could fulfil his duty to fight for the state by serving in the army or the navy. In their reflections on this duty they did not always use the hoplite as the norm. The *dēmos* believed that sailors were just as courageous as hoplites. In their eyes the navy *sōizei* ('saves') the *polis*. They also believed that naval personnel deserved the credit for providing this security. Aristophanes so credited them in his *Acharnians* of 426/5.<sup>153</sup> In it Dicaeopolis is appalled at the proposal to employ Thracian peltasts at double the pay that Athenian hoplites and

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<sup>148</sup> Eupolis's *Maricas*, which largely copied *Knights* (cf. Ar. *Nub.* 551-9), apparently also had political debate about the fleet (Eup. frs. 192.96-8; 210).

<sup>149</sup> Bourriot 1972: 27-8.

<sup>150</sup> Burekhardt 1995: 124-5; Gabrielsen 2008; Pritchard 2015: 102.

<sup>151</sup> E.g. Ar. *Eq.* 551-8; *Ran.* 1073; [Dem.] 50.12-13, 34-5; Isoc. 16.20-1; 18.60-1; MacDowell 1995: 104; Roisman 2005: 124-9.

<sup>152</sup> Bourriot 1972: 29.

<sup>153</sup> Balot 2014: 185.

sailors earned (161-3).<sup>154</sup> On this, he suggests, ‘the *thranitai*-people’ would surely complain (162-3). The *thranitai* rowed the trireme’s top rung of oars.<sup>155</sup> Apparently they saw themselves as more valuable than lightly armed troops. Dicaeopolis endorses this positive self-perception by calling them *sōsipolis* or the saviours of the *polis* (163).<sup>156</sup> Public speakers also spoke of sailors saving the state (e.g. Andoc. 2.12; Dem. 22.13; cf. Pl. *Leg.* 707b-c). In *Acharnians* the chorus also argued, as Athenian litigants did, that their military service warranted leniency for them in the law-courts (676-701). As veterans of Marathon (181), understandably, they mentioned their service as hoplites at this famous battle of the Persians Wars (181, 692-9). But, before they did, they highlighted their fighting in sea battles (677-91). Bourriot argues that Aristophanes never glorified the sailors of the Persian Wars.<sup>157</sup> This last passage, among others, disproves Bourriot’s argument.

Aristophanes equally esteemed sailors again in his *Knights* of 425/4.<sup>158</sup> This comedy’s chorus of horsemen wish to praise (*eulogēsthai*) their fathers, who, they say, were ‘real men worthy of this land’ (565-6). They deserve this praise, the chorus argue, because ‘in land battles and in a fleet (*en te naupharktōi stratōi*) they were always victorious and adorned this state’ (567-8; cf. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 503/4.1-4).<sup>159</sup> In the chorus’s eyes those who fight at sea clearly deserve praise no less than those who do so on land. The victories of both equally benefit the state. The chorus now give the reason for this military success. The Athenians often put victory down to the *aretē* of the victors.<sup>160</sup> Here Aristophanes did the same. Their fathers, the chorus state, always won, ‘because no one of them, when he saw the enemy, counted their number’ (Ar. *Eq.* 569-70). In funeral speeches courageous Athenians likewise disregarded the enemy’s numbers (e.g. Lys. 2.24, 37, 40, 63; Pl. *Menex.* 240d).<sup>161</sup> Facing them, the chorus continue, ‘their *thumos* straightaway was on guard’ (Ar. *Eq.* 570). Athenian

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<sup>154</sup> The going rate for the latter was 1 drachma per day (e.g. Thuc. 3.17.4; 6.8.1, 31.3; 7.27.1-2; Pritchard 2015: 13).

<sup>155</sup> Van Wees 2004: 211.

<sup>156</sup> Pace Jordan 2000: 85 Aristophanes was here praising contemporary sailors not those of the Persian Wars.

<sup>157</sup> Bourriot 1972: 30; cf. Ehrenberg 1951: 299.

<sup>158</sup> Butera 2010: 145-6.

<sup>159</sup> Classical-period authors often employed the phrase *nautikos stratos* (‘naval force’) to describe a fleet (e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 634; Hdt. 3.17, 19, 44; 4.87, 89; 6.31, 62; Thuc. 7.70-1). They sometimes contrasted such a *nautikos stratos* with land forces (e.g. Hdt. 3.17; 4.167, 203; 6.45; 7.58; 8.60; Thuc. 6.97-1). This contrast shows that the phrase did not refer to a land army that was being transported by ship. In these lines Aristophanes used instead *naupharktos stratos* (‘ship-fenced force’). *Naupharktos* is ‘of a poetic cast’ (Sommerstein 1981: 175). Aeschylus used this adjective to refer to the fleets that fought at Salamis (*Pers.* 950-2, 1029). Euripides employed *naupharktos strateuma* to describe a fleet (*IA* 1259-60). *Strateuma* and *stratos* could, of course, be used interchangeably (e.g. Hdt. 3.150). *Naupharktos* appears to be a tragic synonym for *nautikos*. Therefore the *en te naupharktōi stratōi* of Ar. *Eq.* 567 is best translated as ‘in a fleet’.

<sup>160</sup> E.g. Dem. 60.21; Lys. 10.28-9; 2.4-6, 20, 24, 64-5; Pl. *Menex.* 240d, 243c.

<sup>161</sup> Arrington 2015: 107.

writers used *thumos* as a synonym for *aretē*.<sup>162</sup> This passage thus also makes sailors, like soldiers, courageous.

The chorus draw this eulogy to a close by describing this courage of their fathers (Ar. *Eq.* 571-3). The Athenians usually based descriptions of bravery on what hoplites did to win pitched battles.<sup>163</sup> This represented a problem for Aristophanes, as sailors fought in a different way and so did not do what brave hoplites did (see section 2). Using the hoplite here as the norm of courage risked making sailors look less courageous. Aristophanes deftly sidestepped this risk with a sporting metaphor.<sup>164</sup> The Athenians thought that athletes and warriors required the same virtues.<sup>165</sup> This meant that they could draw on the actions of one group to describe the other. ‘But if ever’, the chorus conclude, ‘they fell on their shoulder in battle, they would wipe clean this fall, deny that they had fallen and resume their wrestling-bout (571-3).’ In the final *agōn* of *Knights* sailors are again highly esteemed. Sausage Seller attempts to win over Demos by praising his service as both a hoplite at Marathon and a sailor at Salamis (781-5). As part of his attempt Paphlagon assumes that the *dēmos* in their entirety row in the navy (881-2). Such passages suggest that the classical Athenians saw naval service ‘as a component of their ethnic identity’ (e.g. Soph. *OC* 707-19; Thuc. 1.142.6; cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 908-9).<sup>166</sup>

In his *Wasps* of 423/2 Aristophanes repeatedly depicted sailors doing as much good to the state as hoplites.<sup>167</sup> This comedy is about a son’s efforts to get his elderly father to retire from service as a juror. One of his arguments for Philocleon’s retirement is that only politicians are getting rich from the empire that the *dēmos* created (667-724). Bdelycleon tells his father that their imperial subjects shower politicians with gifts (667-7). But they give the *dēmos* nothing, even though the service of ordinary Athenians in the army and the navy made them subjects in the first place (668-9). For Bdelycleon it is simply ‘slavery’ that the politicians take the paid government jobs, while the jurors only get 3 obols per day (862-4). What makes it worse, Bdelycleon continues, is that they ‘acquired’ the money for their own pay ‘by bearing many *ponoi* (‘toils’) while rowing, fighting infantry battles and besieging’ (684-5).<sup>168</sup> There ‘is no social restrictiveness here’: the *ponoi* of sailors no less than hoplites created the empire.<sup>169</sup> Both groups are depicted equally benefitting the state.

The choral interlude of *Wasps* repeats this depiction. In it the chorus of elderly jurors first discuss what they did as hoplites in the Persian Wars (1075-90). This army service, they claim, ‘greatly benefitted the state’ (1077-8). They make the same claim

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<sup>162</sup> E.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 394; Soph. *El.* 26-8; Pl. *Resp.* 411c; Xen. *Cyr.* 4.2.11.

<sup>163</sup> E.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 1025; Ar. *Pax* 1177-8; Eur. *El.* 388-90; *Her.* 159-64; Lys. 16.15-16; Pritchard 2010: 17-18.

<sup>164</sup> For such metaphors in old comedy see e.g. Pritchard 2013: 119-20.

<sup>165</sup> Pritchard 2013: 176-88.

<sup>166</sup> Quotation from Gabrielsen 2002: 208-9.

<sup>167</sup> Balot 2014: 185, 191; Miller 2010: 333; Okál 1960: 106-8.

<sup>168</sup> Pritchard 2015: 52-90 shows that the Athenians did not rely on tribute to pay for their democracy.

<sup>169</sup> Quotation from Heath 1987: 39-40.

about their service in the navy (1091-101). In the wars against the Persians they only cared about ‘who the best rower was’ (1097-8). ‘Consequently’, the chorus continue, ‘we took many *poleis* from the Persians and bear the most responsibility for bringing the tribute here’ (1097-100). At the end of their *parabasis* the chorus complain (1117-20): ‘This is most painful for us, if someone who has dodged the draft (*astrateutos ōn*) gulps down our pay, although he has not, for his country, taken up an oar, a spear or even a blister. What we think is best is that in the future whichever citizen does not have a sharp sting will not acquire 3 obols.’ This complaint confirmed the popular perception of military service. The Athenians generally believed that those who participated in their government should serve in the armed forces when they were drafted (e.g. *Lys.* 16.17). Indeed in the 420s they already had the offence of *astrateia* or draft-evasion (e.g. *Ar. Eq.* 443). Those citizens that were convicted of it or one of the other military offences were stripped of their legal and political rights.<sup>170</sup> Consequently there is not much substance to the chorus’s complaint. Draft-dodgers could already be barred from jury service. What is notable is their assumption that an Athenian could fulfil his duty to fight for the state by serving either as a hoplite or a sailor.<sup>171</sup> In his depiction of this duty Aristophanes did not see the need to use the hoplite as the norm.

Bourriot, among others, argues that Aristophanes seriously criticised sailors in his *Frogs* of 406/5.<sup>172</sup> This comedy depicted Aeschylus and Euripides, after their deaths, engaged in a debate about who had been the best tragic poet. In the course of this *agōn* Aeschylus claims that today’s crew of the *Paralus* argue with their petty officers, because Euripides taught the Athenians always to debate everything (1069-72; cf. 1076). The *Paralus* was the other trireme that Athens used for the sending of urgent messages (see section 4 above). Athenian sailors were expected to keep good order and silently to wait for commands.<sup>173</sup> Aristophanes’s audience would thus have been appalled if the *Paralus*’s sailors failed to meet these norms. But it is far from certain that they took Aeschylus’s claim seriously. In this debate Euripides has just claimed that he improved morality (1009-10). Aeschylus is attempting to prove him wrong with counter claims (1011-13). His criticism of sailors is one of them. For him Euripides also caused the young to abandon athletics (1071-2, 1087-98). Aeschylus claims that his rival taught the wealthy how to evade the trierarchy (1062-5). Athenians, once again, were not supposed to behave like this. The *dēmos* saw athletics as good (e.g. *Aeschin.* 1.138; *Antiph.* 3.2.5).<sup>174</sup> They expected the sons of the wealthy to be educated in it (e.g. *Aeschin.* 1.9-11; *Dem.* 27.46; *Hyp.* 6.8-9; *Isae.*

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<sup>170</sup> For these military offences see e.g. *Aeschin.* 3.175-6; *Andoc.* 1.74; *Ar. Eq.* 368; *Nub.* 353-4; *Dem.* 15.32; 21.103; 39.16-17; [*Dem.*] 59.27; *Lys.* 14.5-7, 11-12; 15.4, 11; [*Xen.*] *Ath. Pol.* 3.5; MacDowell 1978: 159-61.

<sup>171</sup> Sargent 1927: 264-5.

<sup>172</sup> Bourriot 1972: 27-8; Okál 1960: 108; van Wees 2004: 200.

<sup>173</sup> E.g. *Aesch. Pers.* 399, 470; *Ar. Ran.* 1072-3; fr. 86; *Thuc.* 2.89.9; 3.77.2-3; *Xen. Mem.* 3.5.5-6; Cartledge 1998: 64; Strauss 2007: 229-36.

<sup>174</sup> Pritchard 2013: 103-4, 116-19, 122-3.

9.28). They also saw it as the elite's duty to perform trierarchies and the other liturgies (e.g. Ar. *Lys.* 653-4; Dem. 42.22; *Lys.* 21.10).<sup>175</sup>

As much as these counter claims added to this fantastical rebuttal of Euripides, they were completely untrue. Throughout the classical period wealthy boys continued to attend the classes of a *paidotribēs* ('athletics-teacher').<sup>176</sup> Their fathers – we will see – still regularly commanded warships. There is no reason to believe that Aeschylus's criticism of sailors was less untrue. The crews of the *Paralus* and the *Salaminia* were full-time professionals.<sup>177</sup> They were the elite sailors of the Athenian navy. The claim that they failed to observe basic norms of naval service was simply unbelievable. In the midst of this comedy's *agōn* Aristophanes's Aeschylus apparently falsely accused the Athenians of immorality. Such false allegations were a commonplace of old comedy (see section 2). Because Athenian theatregoers 'shared the supposedly exclusive British quality of being able to laugh at themselves', they found them really funny.<sup>178</sup> Therefore what Aristophanes wrote about sailors in *Frogs* was part of his efforts to raise laughs. It was not meant to be serious criticism of naval personnel.

Old comedy's positive depiction of sailors parallels what we find in contemporary law-court speeches. Athenian litigants invariably tried to secure the gratitude of their jurors by cataloguing the *agatha* that they had done for the state. Military service prominently figured in such catalogues.<sup>179</sup> As nearly all those that delivered the surviving speeches were wealthy, they could also catalogue their liturgies and their payments of the *eisphora*. The latter was an intermittent tax on the elite's property to pay for war.<sup>180</sup> Litigants saw no harm whatsoever in describing at length their trierarchies (e.g. *Lys.* 21.6-8). Sometimes these descriptions of their commands of warships doubled up as accounts of their active military service (e.g. *Lys.* fr. 9c Todd). One speaker, for example, ended his speech by narrating the *erga* ('deeds') that he had performed as a trierarch after Athens's final defeat in 405/4 (Isoc. 18.58-62). In recognition of them, he added, the *dēmos* had rewarded him for his courage (65). But more often than not speakers separated their military service from their other benefactions. They always made out that naval service was no less of a benefit to the state than service in the army.<sup>181</sup> For example, one defendant asked to be acquitted, because, among other reasons, he had 'fought many sea battles for the state and many land battles' (*Lys.* 7.41). When there were no land battles to speak of, speakers simply catalogued their sea battles (e.g. 21.6-10, 24-5; 25.12-13; cf. Ar. *Ran.* 693-702). In general they never expressed any contempt for sailors.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> Christ 2006: 171-84.

<sup>176</sup> Pritchard 2013: 34-83.

<sup>177</sup> Pritchard 2015: 108-9.

<sup>178</sup> Quotation from Forrest 1986: 233.

<sup>179</sup> Hunt 2010: 255; Pernot 2015: 15-16.

<sup>180</sup> E.g. Antiph. 2.3.8; Ar. *Eq.* 923-6; Dem. 4.7; 10.37; 27.66; *Lys.* 22.10; 27.9-10; Christ 2007: 54.

<sup>181</sup> Roisman 2005: 127 n. 69.

<sup>182</sup> Balot 2014: 188.

Athenian litigants could also attack the service-records of their opponents (e.g. Isoc. 18.47-8; Lys. 31.7, 14). Even in such attacks they equally esteemed both wings of the armed forces.<sup>183</sup> A good example is a speech from 399/8. In it the speaker asked whether the defendant could be ‘acquitted’, because ‘as a courageous man he had participated in many land battles and sea battles’ (Lys. 30.26). He could not, the speaker answered, as he had stayed at home, while the jurors had risked their lives as sailors. In a genuine prosecution speech against Andocides the same argument was made.<sup>184</sup> This prosecutor asked whether his opponent’s service ‘as a courageous combatant’ warranted his acquittal ([Lys.] 6.46). Again it did not, because, he argued, Andocides had never campaigned ‘either as a horseman, a hoplite, a trierarch or an *epibatēs*’. *Epibatai* were the hoplites that formed part of a trireme’s crew.<sup>185</sup> Both of these speakers made out that an Athenian could fulfil his military duty in the army or the navy. In talking about this duty they did not use the hoplite as the norm any more than the comic poets did. In addition they characterised sailors as courageous as soldiers. Other speeches made the same characterisation. In a law-court speech that he personally delivered Lysias attributed *aretē* to the Athenian sailors of a battle in 406/5 (Lys. 12.136).<sup>186</sup> Litigants regularly spoke of the *kindunoi* (‘dangers’) that sailors bore in sea battles (e.g. Isoc. 18.62; Lys.19.20; 21.7, 11, 24; 30.22). For the Athenians the bearing of such personal risks was a sign of courage (e.g. Eur. *HF* 159-64).<sup>187</sup> Contemporaneous funeral speeches likewise depicted sailors and soldiers as the same: victory at sea proved Athenian *aretē* no less than on land.<sup>188</sup>

## 6. Conclusion: Advancing the Four Debates

This article advances the four ongoing debates relating to sailors in old comedy as follows. The comic depiction of sailors was overwhelmingly positive. On stage Aristophanes esteemed sailors as highly as hoplites. He made out that both groups of combatants exhibited *aretē* (‘courage’) in battle. The *ponoi* (‘toils’) that each group bore equally benefitted the state. For his characters and choruses the victories of hoplites and sailors deserved the same praise. In old comedy Athenians equally met their duty to fight for the state by serving in either wing of the armed forces. In depicting this duty Aristophanes did not have to focus on the hoplite. In fact the old comedy’s use of this soldier as a norm was limited. The comic poets drew on his experiences when they wanted to depict war in general. Aristophanes again focussed on the hoplite when he described Attic women’s relationship to war. Yet he still fully recognised that Athens primarily waged war with warships. On stage this state’s *dunamis* (‘military might’) and *sōtēria* (‘security’) depended on them. Aristophanes gave sailors the credit for providing this security. Consequently he described them as

<sup>183</sup> Kapellos 2014: 45 n. 299.

<sup>184</sup> [Lys.] 6 may not have been written by Lysias but today’s consensus is that it is a genuine law-court speech (Todd 2000: 63-4; 2007a: 403-8).

<sup>185</sup> Burckhardt 1995: 121-2; Gabrielsen 2002: 212-14; Zaccarini 2015.

<sup>186</sup> Later in the fourth century public speakers regularly recognised the *aretē* of sailors (e.g. Aeschin. 2.75; Lycurg. 1.68-70, 136; Balot 2014: 194; Pritchard 2015: 100).

<sup>187</sup> Pritchard 2010: 17-18.

<sup>188</sup> E.g. Lys. 2.24, 33, 40, 42-3, 47-8; Pl. *Menex.* 240e-1a, 242d-e, 243c-d; Pritchard 2010: 36.

*sōsipolis* ('saviours of the state'). His characters insisted that the state promptly pay them.

This positive depiction of sailors parallels what we find in contemporaneous oratory. The audiences that Athenian politicians and litigants faced were predominantly nonelite. The votes of audience-members directly determined who would win the debate or the trial. Consequently public speakers were under real pressure to say what nonelite Athenians wanted to hear. Their speeches had to confirm the perceptions of the *dēmos* ('people'). All this makes the parallels between old comedy and oratory significant. These parallels demonstrate that the comic poets confirmed popular perceptions about sailors. A good example is their pay. Oratory confirms that the *dēmos* saw the prompt payment of it as a priority. In insisting on this Aristophanes was not criticising sailors. He was simply confirming a popular perception. Yet Aristophanes at times confounded such perceptions. In his anti-war plays he depicted nonelite hoplites dodging their duty to fight for the state. Another of his plays depicted the state's best sailors breaking basic norms of naval warfare. Audience-members knew that these depictions were untrue. Such false allegations were standard for old comedy. Athenians found them really funny. Therefore Aristophanes's depictions of hoplites and sailors behaving immorally were not serious criticisms. They were part of his efforts to get his audience to laugh.

For Heath a 'weakness of recent work on Aristophanes has been its neglect of fourth-century oratory'.<sup>189</sup> Addressing it advances the debate on whether old comedy is reliable evidence for popular culture. The case that it is currently does not go beyond the genre. It rests on the observation that Aristophanes took the side of the *dēmos* in his treatment of current affairs. This case is bolstered by the performance-dynamic that the comic poets faced. Their audience did not directly determine who would win the comic *agōn*. But theatregoers's boisterous responses did sway the contest's judges. The result – according to this case's advocates – was that old comedy had to confirm popular perceptions. Oratory certainly did so. If, therefore, this case is correct, we would expect to see numerous parallels between the two genres. The depictions of sailors in old comedy and oratory clearly parallel each other. The handful of studies that compare their depictions of politicians and of social classes reveal more parallels.<sup>190</sup> For sure more work on such parallels is required. But what has been done already strengthens the case for old comedy's reliability as evidence of Athenian popular culture.

In thinking of war the classical Athenian people certainly appropriated a lot from the culture of their elite forebears. From them they inherited the idea that victory in battle came from the *aretē* of the victors. They continued to base their descriptions of courage on what the hoplite did to win his pitched battles. On stage this soldier remained the central figure in generalisations about war and gender-roles. But the Athenian *dēmos* also redefined significant elements of this inherited elite culture. They rejected the low estimation that archaic aristocrats had made of sailors.

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<sup>189</sup> Heath 1997: 234.

<sup>190</sup> For comparisons of their depictions of politicians see e.g. Ober and Strauss 1990; Pritchard 2012: 31-9. For social classes see e.g. Pritchard 2012: 21-30; 2013: 2-9; Rosivach 1991.

They esteemed them as highly as hoplites. For the *dēmos* both wings of the armed forces equally benefitted the state. They invented a new abstract theory of seapower. They came to see *aretē* in what sailors did in battle. Seeing sailors as courageous, of course, sat uneasily with the hoplite-based description of courage, because the two groups fought very differently. But Athenian popular culture was never logically consistent.<sup>191</sup> It could easily accommodate such contradictory ideas. This cultural flexibility helped Athenian sailors to gain wide public recognition. Consequently they did not need to develop their own subculture to have the esteem that they desired.

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<sup>191</sup> E.g. Pritchard 1998: 44, 55-6.

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